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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
CONGRESS DROPS THE BALL AGAIN: BASEBALL'S
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION REMAINS IN PLACE
I. INTRODUCTION
The loss of the 1994-95 baseball season has had a demoralizing effect on all
of America, including members of Congress. Because of the strike, the players
and the American public have turned to Congress to take action and Congress
has felt the pressure. In its past session, Congress took a significant step toward
passing legislation to remove baseball's antitrust exemption, but the Congressio-
nal session ended without action.' Professional baseball's exemption from the
antitrust laws has been on shaky legal ground since its inception in 1922. In
fact, in 1971, the Supreme Court made it clear that the task of eliminating the
exemption was in Congress' hands.3 Since the Court's 1971 ruling, various bills
have been introduced in the Senate and the House to remove or at least limit the
exemption. However, even with the pressures of the current strike, Congress has
dropped the ball and failed once again to pass legislation to lift the exemption.
This update will first examine the background of the federal antitrust laws, the
three Supreme Court decisions that initiated and reaffirmed baseball's unique
exemption, and the events culminating in the 1994 strike. Second, the recently
proposed Senate and House bills will be examined in detail including the proce-
dural, substantive and remedial aspects of the bills. Finally, the impact on the
sports and entertainment world will be analyzed, including the consequences to
baseball once the strike is over.
II. BACKGROUND
The federal antitrust laws, including the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890,
4
were implemented to protect trade and commerce from monopolies and from any
conspiracy that would hinder a freely competitive market. There are two relevant
provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act that in theory would apply to profession-
1. The proposed legislation analyzed in this update includes: (1) S. 500, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (Professional Baseball Antitrust Reform Act); (2) H.R. 4994, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)
(Baseball Fans and Communities Protection Act of 1994); and (3) S. 2380, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) (Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994).
2. 139 CONG. REc. S2416-02 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1993) (statement of Senator Metzenbaum).
3. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
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al baseball.5 First, the Act makes "conspiracies to contract that unreasonably
restrain trade in interstate commerce" unlawful.6 Second, the Act "prohibits con-
duct that monopolizes interstate commerce".7 However, since the Supreme
Court's decision in 1922, professional baseball has enjoyed an exemption to the
antitrust laws.'
In 1922, the issue was first presented to the Supreme Court in the case of
Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat'l League of Prof. Baseball.9 In an opin-
ion written by Justice Holmes, the Court held that the antitrust laws did not
apply to baseball because it was a sport and therefore could not be considered
interstate commerce.'" Because baseball was considered to be a game and not a
business, the antitrust laws could not be applied to protect the players from the
owners.
In 1953, this issue was revisited in the case of Toolson v. NY Yankees"
where Holmes' decision was affirmed, but not on the basis that baseball was not
interstate commerce. This time, the Court stated that Congress had no intention
of including the business of baseball within the scope of the antitrust laws, and
reaffirmed the exemption based on that Congressional intent.
In Flood v. Kuhn,'2 the Supreme Court revisited the issue for a third and
final time. However, this decision was based on even shakier legal reasoning
than the Court's deference to Congressional intent in Toolson. The court openly
admitted that "[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate
commerce,"' 3 as everyone had realized for decades. Then why would not the
antitrust laws apply to the business of baseball? The Court concluded that the
antitrust exemption should be removed, but by Congress and not the Supreme
Court.'4
The antitrust exemption is only enjoyed by one professional sport, baseball.
The only rationale that supports the continuing existence of baseball's exemption
can be found in the Supreme Court's Toolson opinion. Decisions affecting base-
ball are of the utmost importance to the American public, Therefore, many peo-
ple believe that it is Congress' role to implement such an important decision
because it is the representative body of the American public. The dissent in
Toolson conceded that due to "the high place it [baseball] enjoys in the hearts of
our people and the possible justification of special treatment ... the authoriza-
5. Latour Rey Lafferty, The Tampa Bay Giants and the Continuing Vitality of Major League
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1271, 1273 (1994).
6. Id. at 1274.
7. Id.
8. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat'l League of Prof. Baseball, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
9. Id.
10. See Julie Dorst, Franchise Relocation: Reconsidering Major League Baseball's Carte Blanche
Control, 4 SErON HALL J. SPORT L. 553 (1994), at n. 10.
11. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
12. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
13. Id. at 282.
14. Id. at 285.
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tion of such treatment is a matter within the discretion of Congress."' 5 Howev-
er, Congress has not acted to remove the exemption, even with the pressures of
numerous strikes over the years.'6
The present baseball strike began on August 12, 1994 as a result of bitter
disagreements between players and owners, including disputes over a proposed
salary cap by the owners. Before exploring the arguments to remove the exemp-
tion, it is necessary to examine how the exemption affects professional baseball
in practice. The exemption allows the owners to comer the market on franchises
and broadcasting, decreases mobility in the marketplace and allows owners to
restrict player mobility through collective bargaining agreements.' 7 Moreover, it
leads to unfair labor struggles between the players and the owners because the
players are powerless to seek redress in the federal court system, if they feel
they are being oppressed.'" The players, therefore, have but one remedy, namely
to STRIKE.
There are three basic arguments made on behalf of the players in support of
eliminating the antitrust exemption. First, the removal of the exemption will end
the strike and baseball can be played again. By providing a forum in the federal
courts, the players would not be forced to strike because they could take their
labor grievances to court.
Second, a legal argument can be made that Congress passed the antitrust laws
to regulate businesses engaged in interstate commerce and that there is no legal
basis for Congress to allow baseball to continue to be singled out for an exemp-
tion. In fact, Flood settled the question that baseball is interstate commerce and
that the longstanding exemption is a legal anomaly because there was no justifi-
cation for excluding a business engaged in interstate commerce from the antitrust
laws. 9 The Supreme Court justified its decision due to the importance of stare
decisis and shifted the obligation to act onto Congress." "Major league baseball
is a vast, complex organization of multi-million dollar franchises, broadcast
rights and concession deals" and this is precisely the type of big business that
Congress typically regulates under the antitrust laws.2 ' Therefore, by not elimi-
nating the baseball exemption, Congress is perpetuating an anomaly. Congress
should repeal the exemption and put baseball on equal footing with the other
professional sports and big businesses.
Finally, the players argue that the artificial restriction of supply enjoyed by
the owners is contrary to public policy.' This argument is threefold: first, "the
15. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 364.
16. See Robert G. Berger, After the Strikes: A Reexamination of Professional Baseball's Exemp-
tion From the Antitrust Laws, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 209 (1983).
17. Dorst, supra note 10, at 588.
18. Antitrust Exemption Lives For Now, Cm. TRIB., Oct 1, 1994, at A2.
19. Flood, 407 U.S. at 258.
20. Id.
21. 139 CONG. REc. at S2416-02, 2420 (statement of Senator Graham).
22. See Dorst, supra note 10, at 587, n.238 (quoting statement of Richard B. Dodge, St. Peters-
burg Assistant City Manager). See also 139 CONG. REc. at S2419 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
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artificially inflated value of a franchise creates tremendous pressure upon com-
peting communities to subsidize the teams through rent concessions and uneco-
nomic leases."' This makes it difficult for smaller communities to sustain a
professional baseball team in their hometown. Second, the antitrust exemption
permits competing communities to drive up the value of an existing franchise
which makes it difficult for a community to obtain a franchise.2 4 Finally, it al-
lows the business of baseball to be conducted in complete secrecy without any
accountability to the public because there are no external controls on what man-
agement is permitted to do.'
In 1993 and 1994, Congress proposed legislation to remove, or at least limit
the antitrust exemption. The provisions of three of these proposed bills will be
analyzed along with their potential impact on the sports and entertainment world.
I1. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Many argued that the 1994-95 baseball season could be salvaged only if Con-
gress would take the problem into its own hands and legislate.26 However, the
103rd Congressional session ended without implementing legislation that would
limit or eliminate the exemption. The three proposed bills that will be examined
in this update are the Professional Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1993,27 the
Baseball Fans Protection Act of 199428 and the Baseball Fans and Communities
Protection Act of 1994.29 The proposed legislation gained some support in both
the House and the Senate, but all three acts were withdrawn or abandoned due to
lack of time or support.
Passing legislation to remove the exemption is difficult due to the political
nature of the issue. Congress is influenced by the lobby of the team owners and
the necessity of keeping business persons happy? In addition, members of
Congress are necessarily influenced by the possibility of their hometown teams
leaving, a likely consequence if the owners and managers of professional base-
ball teams become susceptible to antitrust challenges in court and are conse-
quently no longer able to control the alienability of their franchises."
Therefore, baseball's exemption could be an important domestic issue on the
Congressional agenda in its next session. A revamped Congress is sure to revisit
the issue next year if the strike is not resolved.32 The proposed bills that are the
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Mark Maske, Congress Halts Efforts On Antitrust Exemption, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1994,
at B3; see also Bob Klapisch, Change in a Changing World, SPORTING NEwS, Oct. 10, 1994, v. 218,
at 36.
27. S. 500, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
28. S. 2380, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
29. H.R. 4994, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
30. 139 CONG. Rc. at S2417 (statement of Senator Metzenbaum).
31. Id.
32. Congress to Hold Hearings on Strike, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct 4, 1994, at B13.
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subject of this update should provide a basic understanding of the type of legisla-
tion that Congress is likely to introduce in January.
A. THE PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL ANTTRusT REFORM ACT OF 1993
The Professional Baseball Antitrust Reform Act was introduced on March 4,
1993 by Senator Howard Metzenbaum.33 The express purpose of the act was to
provide that professional baseball teams and leagues composed of such teams
would be subject to the antitrust laws.34 Senator Metzenbaum stated that the bill
was not designed to punish or threaten the owners, but to benefit the public, fans
and the sport itself.3  In his introductory remarks before the Senate, Mr.
Metzenbaum stated, "As a legal matter, the basis for baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion is insupportable. The question is whether there is some overriding policy
reason to continue to allow baseball to be totally exempt from the antitrust
laws".36 He concluded that there was not.37
The procedural aspects of the proposed bill involved amending the antitrust
laws to reverse the Supreme Court's trilogy of cases granting and reaffirming the
exemption. The bill proposed amendment of the Clayton Act3 by adding the
language "Except as provided in Public Law 87-331,39 the antitrust laws shall
apply to the business of organized professional baseball." The provisions and
amendments made by the Act were designed to take effect one year after its en-
actment.
However, S. 500, as predicted, did not pass.' The last action date on the bill
was June 23, 1994, when the bill was stalled indefinitely because the Senate
Judiciary Committee failed to approve it for reporting.4
The difficulty that the proponents of the bill had in obtaining support was
exemplified by Senator Wellstone's "inner conflict" in withdrawing his support
for S. 500. He stated, "Baseball holds a unique place in our culture as well as in
our economy. It is one of the great American pastimes and I would be remiss if
I did not give this issue greater thought and consideration."'42 Although S. 500
failed in its attempts, the Senate revisited the issue on August 11, 1994, one day
33. Senator Metzenbaum is a Democrat from Ohio and a long-time proponent of eliminating the
antitrust exemption for baseball. Senator Metzenbaum retires at the end of 1994. Baseball Congress,
THE SPoRTs NETwoRK, Sept. 30, 1994.
34. S. 500, 103rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1993).
35. 139 CONG. REc. at S2416 (statement of Senator Metzenbaum).
36. 139 CoNG. REC. at S2417.
37. Id.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1994).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 291 (1994), (commonly known as the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961). The ex-
ception mentioned here is beyond the scope of this analysis.
40. See S. 500, 103rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (Information for Public Affairs on Bill Number S.
500), which estimates the likelihood that a given bill will pass at each stage in Congress. The pre-
dictions for this bill were as follows: Senate Committee on Judiciary (29%); House Committee
(16%); Senate Floor (21%); House (15%).
41. 140 CONG. REc. D726-01 (daily ed.'June 23, 1994).
42. 139 CONG. REc. S12744 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1993).
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before the strike.
B. S. 2380, BASEBALL FANS PROTECTION ACT OF 1994 AND H.R. 4649
The Baseball Fans Protection Act of 19944e (the "Act") was introduced on
August 11, 1994, by Senator Metzenbaum with the express purpose of encour-
aging negotiations between the major league baseball players and the owners "in
order to prevent a strike by the players or a lockout by the owners so that fans
will be able to enjoy the remainder of the baseball season, the playoffs and the
World Series."' However, it seems impossible to ignore the type of message
that Congress was trying to send to the owners, namely that Congress might act
if the owners did not. Senators Metzenbaum and Hatch proposed attaching the
Act as an amendment to H.R. 4649, a District of Columbia appropriations bill in
an attempt to get the Act passed by the end of the 1994 Congressional ses-
sion.4"
Implementation of the Act would not have repealed the antitrust exemption
altogether, but would have provided for the application of the antitrust laws to
professional baseball in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances.' The Act
applied the antitrust laws to any unilateral terms imposed in baseball labor nego-
tiations in the absence of a contract.47 Therefore, the players would have been
granted their day in court if the owners unilaterally imposed a salary cap.
However, just as in 1993 S. 500 failed to gain the support of the Senate, this
Act was withdrawn just before the 103rd session closed in October of 1994. Bud
Selig, the commissioner of baseball, boasted that the Act "would have been
defeated by about a two-thirds majority of the Senate."' Although his predic-
tion was probably accurate, the hearings and publicity that revolved around the
proposed Act had a significant impact on Congress and on the likelihood of
removing the exemption in the future.
The Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994 had a more direct impact than S.
500 for two reasons. First, because time was of the essence, the Act's proponents
got the rest of Congress' attention by attempting to attach the Act to the District
of Columbia appropriations bill. Without opposition, this action would have been
immediate. Additionally, unlike S. 500, which was proposed a year and a half
before the strike, Congress was concerned with remedying the immediate prob-
lem posed by the strike.49 Congress' attempt to do something quickly by intro-
43. The text of the Act appears as S. 2380 and as a proposed amendment No. 2601 to the House
amendment to the Senate amendment number 12 to H.R. 4649.
44. S. 2380. (S. 2380 was co-sponsored by two Democrats (Senators Feingold and Pell) and one
Republican (Senator Pell)).
45. 140 CONG. REC. S13888-01 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1994).
46. S. 2380, supra note 1.
47. Id.
48. Mark Meske, Congress Halts Efforts on Antitrust Exemption, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1994, at
B3.
49. S. 500 was introduced in March of 1993, but was not voted on in the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee until June of 1994.
[Vol. V: 147
6
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol5/iss1/6
1995] BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 153
ducing the Act, although futile, indicated its willingness to legislate in this area.
The message was clear that the owners had received "a wake up call" and that
Congress was ready to act if there was not a resolution by the next Congressio-
nal session.'
The second result of the proposed Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994 was
the impact on the American public due to the publicity the proposed legislation
received in the media. The American people wanted baseball to be played in
1995 and many Americans supported and continue to support a Congressional
role in ending the strike.
C. H.R. 4994 BASEBALL FANS AND COMMUNITIES PROTECTION ACT OF 1994
Unlike The Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994 and s. 500, H.R. 4994 was
introduced by Representative Mike Synar, in the House of Representatives, six
days after the baseball strike of 1994.5' Its purpose was specifically to end the
1994 strike, not just to prevent labor disputes between the players and avoid a
future strike. The express purposes of the proposed Act were first, to apply the
antitrust laws of the U.S. to the major baseball league in exceptional and extraor-
dinary circumstances; second, to encourage serious negotiations between the
players and the owners; and finally, to prevent the suffering of economic losses
by those whose livelihood depends on professional baseball.
Procedurally, the Act was designed to function in essentially the same manner
as The Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994 by applying the antitrust laws to
professional baseball in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. However,
H.R. 4994 was unquestionably more successful in terms of Congressional sup-
port than the earlier proposed bills. A few days before the end of the Congressio-
nal session, the House Judiciary Committee voted in favor of the proposed ex-
emption." The voice vote marked the first time that a congressional committee
has acted against the antitrust exemption.53 However, the Congressional session
ended before any further action was taken. Although Congress failed to eliminate
the exemption, H.R. 4994's proponents were probably content that the bill had
"put the league and the players on notice that the antitrust exemption is on its
deathbed."54
Although Congress failed to legislate and remove the antitrust exemption this
past session, its diligence and increased support for legislation indicated that bills
much like the three examined in this update will be seen on the Senate and
50. Mark Maske, Congress Halts Efforts on Antitrust Exemption, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1994, at
B3 (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch). Senator Hatch co-sponsored S. 2380.
51. Representative Synar is a Democrat from Oklahoma. The co-sponsors of H.R. 4994 are Re-
publican Representatives Bilirakis and Bunning and Democrat Representatives Owens, Gorgon, Wil-
liams, Sanders.
52. Robert L. Jackson, Threat to Antitrust exemption; Baseball: Congressional Committee ap-
proves legislation that would partly remove protection of owners from suits by players, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1994, at 1.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting Representative Synar).
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House floor again when a revamped Congress reconvenes.
IV. THE IMPACT ON THE SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT WORLD
The impact of Congress' failure to legislate and lift or limit the antitrust ex-
emption is clear, there was no 1994-95 World Series and there is no end in sight
for the strike. America's favorite pastime is on permanent hold. This spring the
antitrust exemption will undoubtedly be a hot topic on the floor of Congress.
Therefore, it is worth examining what effect removing the antitrust exemption
altogether or limiting the exemption to exceptional and extraordinary circum-
stances would have on professional baseball."
A. THE IMPACT OF ELIMINATING THE EXEMPTION ALTOGETHER
If professional baseball becomes subject to the antitrust laws, several of the
advantages that the management has traditionally enjoyed might be lost.' First,
baseball may lose its ability to keep franchises from being transferred or to pre-
vent new franchises from being started." In the past, baseball's exemption al-,
lowed owners to operate as a legal monopoly and create tremendous economic
pressures on communities to either sustain or to obtain a franchise." If baseball
no longer has an exemption, smaller communities with less economic power
might not be able to afford a team. Management would lose its economic ad-
vantages to limit transferability. Second, players would gain bargaining power
that they have traditionally lacked. As a result, it is unlikely that the players
would be forced to submit to a unilaterally imposed salary cap, an issue of para-
mount importance in the current strike. Undoubtedly, management would lose the
control that it has enjoyed for so long and would be forced to change its bar-
gaining strategy or battle it out in court.
Although this sounds like putting the players and owners on equal footing and
bringing fairness into the picture, some have argued that the exemption should
not be lifted because it will change the face of baseball as Americans have
known it and lead to unnecessary court battles. 9 While this argument had some
merit in the past, we are now faced with a decision between the strike (no base-
ball) and changing the game to put the players and management on more equal
footing. There is no question that America wants baseball.
Supporters of the players argue that eliminating the antitrust exemption alto-
55. S. 500 is an example of legislation that would eliminate the antitrust exemption altogether.
The Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994 and H.R. 4994 are examples of legislation that would limit
the exemption to exceptional and extraordinary circumstances.
56. Jeffrey A. Durney, Fair or Foul? The Commissioner and Major League Baseball's Disciplin-
ary Process, 41 EMORY L.J. 581, 621 (1992).
57. According to the Major League Rules, to transfer ownership, there must be a vote of three-
fourths of the owners in that league. With the exemption, there is no recourse to challenge such a
rule in federal court. See Dumey, supra note 56, at 621.
58. Dorst, supra note 10, at 588.
59. Id.
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gether would accomplish three significant objectives: first, it would end the
strike; second, it would put the players on equal footing with management; and
finally, it would satisfy America's interests in baseball as both a sport and a
business. However, limiting the exemption would only achieve one of these ob-
jectives, namely ending the strike.
B. THE IMPACT OF LIMITING THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION TO EXCEPTIONAL AND
EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES
The arguments for limiting the antitrust exemption are less compelling than
those for removing the exemption altogether. First, although limiting the exemp-
tion may result in an end to the current strike, this would only be a temporary
solution to the problem. Second, since there is no legitimate basis for continuing
the exemption, limiting the exemption ignores the reality that the exemption
stands on faulty ground. Finally, limiting the exemption ignores the public inter-
est surrounding this issue.
Limiting the antitrust exemption to exceptional and extraordinary circumstanc-
es would only be a temporary solution. It may result in an end to the current
strike because it would give the players an opportunity to go to court to settle
this labor dispute, but it would fail to go the extra mile and put the players on
equal footing with management with respect to bargaining or negotiating power.
For example, if passed, The Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994 would only
apply in the event that a unilateral term or condition is imposed by any party that
has been subject to an agreement between the owners of major league baseball
and the labor organization representing the players of professional baseball.
Therefore, the issue inevitably would be revisited in the future.
Additionally, if legislation simply limiting the exemption was passed, a signif-
icant legal anomaly would still exist. Congress passed the antitrust laws to regu-
late those engaged in interstate commerce. Because baseball is, and has been
recognized as interstate commerce,6 there is no legal basis for baseball's ex-
emption. Merely limiting the exemption would only expose baseball to the an-
titrust laws when a court determines the situation to be "exceptional and extraor-
dinary". This is not the type of remedy that will solve the legal anomaly of
granting unequal treatment to baseball without a justifiable reason. Congress'
original intent in enacting antitrust legislation was to protect an open, competitive
market. This intent would still be ignored if legislation limiting the exemption
were to be passed because a court would have to direct that a circumstance war-
ranted application of the antitrust laws.
Furthermore, the public interest would not be served by implementing the
legislation. The legislation would do nothing to remedy the continual conflict of
franchise mobility and its economic impact on America's fans and communities.
More importantly, the legislation fails to solve the problem that the operation of
baseball franchises is conducted in complete secrecy without any accountability
60. 140 CONG. REc. at S13888.
61. Flood, 407 U.S. at 258.
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to the American public.62 Limiting legislation would only be a temporary and
fact-specific remedy. The legislation may end the strike, but it would be a failure
in many other respects. Therefore, Congress' inquiry this spring should be two-
fold: First, should we legislate and end the strike and second, should we imple-
ment a temporary solution or remove the exemption altogether. If the strike has
not ended by the time Congress reconvenes in 1995, the answer to the first in-
quiry will most likely be yes. America wants to have baseball. The only question
is whether Congress will opt for the temporary solution, or whether it will solve
the problem permanently.
V. CONCLUSION
"The stadiums are silent now, pitiful and empty. The only noise baseball
makes comes from Washington, where players and owners wrestle in front of
Congress. The legislature wonders how to resolve this crazy strike, and every
day the nation asks the same question: Is peace hopeless?"63 The 103rd Con-
gress, in the fall of 1994, dropped the ball and failed to legislate to end the
strike, but the issue will again emerge in 1995 if the strike does not end. Con-
gress will again analyze whether or not to lift or limit the antitrust exemption,
and perhaps finally pass legislation like the proposed Acts that were analyzed
above. Only time will tell, but it seems that the antitrust exemption has outworn
its welcome.
Alison Cackowski
62. Id.
63. Bob Klapisch, Change in a Changing World, SPORTING NEws, Oct. 10, 1994, v. 218, at 36.
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